European boundaries in question? by Bellamy, R et al.
 1 
European Boundaries in Question? 
Richard Bellamy, Joseph Lacey and Kalypso Nicolaïdis 
 
Abstract 
This introduction provides a descriptive typology and normative analysis of the ways 
boundaries are being questioned in Europe. We distinguish between boundary-making 
(defining or redefining the territorial borders of a polity), boundary-crossing (determining 
the rules of access to territorial borders) and boundary-unbundling (allowing boundary-
making and boundary-crossing to vary between policies and polities), noting each of 
these categories possesses internal and external dimensions. Cosmopolitans and statists 
offer contrasting normative evaluations of these processes, favouring weakening and 
maintaining or strengthening state boundaries respectively. We endorse a demoicratic 
approach lying between these two as better reflecting how individuals relate to each other 
and to the EU, a view shared by some but not all contributors to this volume. We 
conclude by situating the contributions within our typological framework, highlighting 
how they illustrate the contemporary questioning of European boundaries  
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Introduction 
Europeans have had a millennial love affair with boundaries. A tiny and crowded 
continent criss-crossed by rivers, mountains, seas and valleys all commandeered as 
‘natural borders’, Europe has been a playground for endless political games involving 
lines in the sand, dynastic land swaps and territorial grabs, all in the name of delineating 
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space for sovereigns of all kinds. Europeans fought countless wars for the privilege of 
remaking boundaries, reifying them through the invention of the nation-state, a political 
form that they proceeded to export to the rest of the globe. Even so, hard frontiers, 
involving passport controls, currency restrictions and barriers to trade only fully 
developed with the First World War. Little wonder that in the wake of the Second World 
War, so many Europeans came to identify peace with the creation of a continent-wide 
space ‘without borders’.  
 
The most potent image of this borderless-ness is the ability of European citizens to freely 
cross national borders. Yet the Schengen Agreement of 1985, abolishing internal borders 
among its signatories, reveals all too tangibly how the removal of some borders 
invariably involves the creation of others. Originating from a failure to reach agreement 
on the abolition of border controls among all the members of the then European 
Economic Community (EEC), it was initially agreed between 5 of the 10 member states 
of the time and eventually came to encompass the four non-EEC states accommodated by 
the creation of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). The borderless Schengen Area 
thereby created a new border by excluding some EU states while including other states 
from outside it. However, when it was finally incorporated into the EU with the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the UK and Ireland retained opt-outs, while the non-EU or 
EFTA states were disqualified from participating in the processes governing its structures 
and rules. As a result, the rights of citizens of the EU and those of the Schengen area 
became differentiated both between and among each group.  
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Originating before the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War, the EU never 
formulated an equivalent ideal of freedom to cross external boundaries. With the prospect 
of enlargement post-1989, though, the open-endedness of membership in the EU conjured 
up an entity that could not be defined once and for all by the kind of hard boundaries that 
we associate with sovereign states, its external boundary management mostly provided by 
its member states. Despite new member states being required to join the Schengen Area, 
Romania and Bulgaria are still excluded. Meanwhile, the 2015 migrant crisis and the 
terrorist attacks in Paris led to a hardening of both external and internal borders, with a 
number of Schengen states temporarily restoring border checks (Monar 2016: 129-30).  
 
To be sure, the picture has always been complicated. First, the opening up of some 
borders has involved the closing of others, with a lack of symmetry of openness and 
closure even within the EU. Second, borders redirect rather than simply stop patterns of 
circulation, can be bridges as well as barriers, or can be viewed as geographical “spines” 
(as Schama refers to Hadrian’s wall) structuring, rather than separating, a local world 
(Nicolaïdis, 2014, Nail, 2016).  Third, when we speak of borders between countries, we 
are actually referring to an array of different kinds of boundaries between different kinds 
of realms, spatial but also economic, functional, religious, ethnic, regulatory. The lack of 
congruence between national, regulatory, jurisdictional and political boundaries within 
the EU has always created a tension between free movement, on the one hand, and the 
very real nature of these functional boundaries, on the other. Fourth, since mental 
boundaries play as important a role as legal ones, we need to apprehend changes in 
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European boundaries as a form of social change subject to intersubjective interferences 
and imaginings.  
 
Against this backdrop, it is an understatement to claim that European boundaries are 
today in question, as the title of this special issue indicates. The ideal of a Europe without 
borders has become deeply contested as concerns for national sovereignty have come to 
the fore. Increasing resistance to deeper integration has rapidly and recently morphed into 
open contestation of Europe by citizens and elites of various stripes. Euro-scepticism can 
be seen as the great come back of European boundaries, epitomized by British citizens’ 
decision to ‘reclaim national sovereignty’ in the most dramatic possible fashion: by 
giving their government a mandate to withdraw from the EU. But the sentiments 
expressed by Brexit are by no means confined to the British Isles. 
 
European boundaries are also put in question through contestation within its existing 
units and the boundaries that define them. Secession of a state from the EU calls into 
question the sustainability and legitimacy of all other European boundaries, many of 
which are under stress from the fallout of the Euro crisis, increasing terrorism and the 
migration crisis. The contestation of the ideal of boundary-less Europe does not need to 
be as dramatic as wholesale territorial ‘exits’ to change the political order that has defined 
European integration for more than half a century. Internally, free movement of people is 
becoming synonymous in many a citizen’s mental maps with ‘welfare tourism’ and face-
to-face social dumping. Externally, enlargement no longer figures so prominently on the 
EU’s political horizon, but the physical and moral pressure created by migrants and 
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refugees increasingly contributes to the production of narratives that test the resilience of 
Europe’s liberal values (Boswell and Geddes 2011).  
 
At the same time, the drawing of boundaries has been a distinctive part of what Michael 
Walzer (1984) referred to as ‘the liberal art of separation’. The paradigmatic liberal 
separation consists of that between church and state – a border between the religious and 
the political designed to allow the free exercise of religion within civil society by 
preventing its entry into politics. Walzer (1983) insisted that the ‘complex equality’ of 
pluralist societies required some separation between different spheres of life if the values 
appropriate to one domain were not to dominate those of others. In this respect, one can 
regard the sovereign borders of states as having facilitated the varieties of capitalism, 
cultures and languages characteristic of the EU. States also offer a mechanism for 
separating certain goods (e.g. health or education) from penetration by markets, so as to 
ensure they are accessible to the general public rather than specific private consumers. 
Indeed, rights typically involve a separation between what is mine and what is yours, as 
in the paradigmatic rights to property and bodily integrity, thereby creating a private 
space that depends on a public authority with the capacity to exclude. None of this is to 
deny that many separations are distinctly illiberal. Those that exclude women or ethnic 
minorities from access to positions of power or membership of various organisations are 
designed to discriminate in ways that entrench inequalities. Likewise, borders can further 
entrench the injustice suffered by the poor and oppressed fleeing failing, burdened or 
repressive regimes. Any appraisal of the EU will turn on how far it does or can retain 
those separations required for diversity while removing those that involve unfair 
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discrimination. For example, many criticisms of the EU derive from the view that the 
single market and the mechanisms for upholding the euro have had the paradoxical effect 
of removing the former while introducing the latter.  
 
This special issue explores the analytical and normative questions which stem from this 
diagnosis. What is the nature of European boundaries and have they been getting thicker 
or thinner over time? What are the consequences of ‘Brexit’ for EU boundaries? Can 
secession from the EU be more or less legitimate? What is a sustainable and legitimate 
accession strategy for the EU? Are more radical forms of differentiated integration 
becoming a necessity for Europe? Can free movement in its current form be sustained? Is 
improved coordination on border control and security a necessary response to terrorism 
and the refugee crisis? The rest of this introduction provides an analytical framework for 
the general study of European boundaries, reflects upon the centrality of political 
boundaries to normative theorising, making explicit the demoicratic bias of several 
papers in this volume,  and outlines the content of the different contributions.  
 
Defining European Boundaries 
 
This volume focuses on political boundaries,  understood as those lines of demarcation 
enforced by a political authority that affect agents’ range of options in producing and 
accessing goods widely understood to be desirable for them in the pursuit of their 
respective goals. So conceived, political boundaries simultaneously serve as mechanisms 
of inclusion and exclusion, providing criteria for determining who is and who is not 
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entitled to participate within a particular scheme for producing such fundamental social 
goods as liberty, security, justice and economic prosperity, and to reap the resulting 
benefits. Agent’ covers both individuals and corporate agents, like states, regions, civil 
society organizations and firms.  
 
Paradigmatically, we think of political boundaries as defining a set of individuals within a 
given territory as citizens, limiting the ability of non-citizens to enter the political 
community, or restricting their right to access certain goods (like social welfare) if they 
are allowed to enter. Nevertheless, in the context of increasing international cooperation, 
states find themselves faced with a vast array of political boundaries, sometimes being on 
the inside and at other times on the outside of a given cooperative scheme. But while 
classic  international clubs are limited to enhancing the production of some good or other 
(e.g. trade), the EU’s reconfiguration of boundaries goes much further. The EU not only 
integrates its member states across a wide range of policy fields, going some way towards 
securing the kind of fundamental goods mentioned above, but also expects that all such 
member states will continue to engage one another in new collective projects where 
possible, as opposed to seeking out international partners from beyond the EU. Unlike 
most international organisations, therefore, the EU’s political boundaries make possible 
the production and distribution of a wide range of important goods for the benefit of 
member states, their citizens and other actors.  
 
Like all multi-level and decentralised polities, the EU has both internal and external 
boundaries. While external boundaries refer to the ultimate territorial reach of the polity, 
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internal boundaries designate particular territories within the wider political community 
that are serviced by their own more or less autonomous political authority. Both internal 
and external boundaries can change in two ways. First,  the territory can either expand or 
contract for one reason or another. Second, jurisdictions within the political territory can 
merge into a larger entity or else disaggregate into two or more smaller jurisdictions. 
While boundaries always imply some kind of exclusion, there are degrees to which any 
given boundary will be closed to others. Internal boundaries are typically quite porous as 
political authorities (like city councils) who possess some degree of jurisdiction within a 
given territory tend to individuals who are recognised as members of the wider polity 
ease of access to the local scheme of cooperation. External boundaries are usually much 
less porous, providing temporary admission to certain approved foreigners for business or 
pleasure, but placing substantial hurdles for those seeking to become long term residents.  
 
For the purpose of this special issue we identify three categories of phenomena pertaining 
to European boundaries: boundary-making; boundary-crossing and boundary unbundling, 
each of which possesses an internal and external dimension and each of which is subject 
to change.  
 
We define boundary-making as changes affecting the real and imagined composition and 
territorial reach of the political community. These borders are real in having an 
institutional expression, thereby creating a scheme of inclusion and exclusion. But they 
are imagined in being social facts that require the collective recognition of those involved 
in the cooperative scheme for their existence. The importance of this point becomes 
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evident when we consider the possibility of imagined boundaries becoming decoupled 
from recognised political boundaries. Very often we find this to be the source of 
boundary contestation – the imagined community of some no longer sufficiently 
corresponding to the imagined community of others.  
 
By contrast, boundary-crossing  refers to incentives for and constraints on the movement 
of people, goods and services as determined by the rules governing rights of access for 
their moving across internal and external boundaries. The rules governing access to 
residency (including the right to work and welfare entitlements) are paramount for 
individuals, whereas customs duties and regulations (e.g. environmental, health and 
safety, etc.) determine how businesses interact with territorial borders.  
  
While boundary-making and boundary-crossing are familiar categories, boundary-
unbundling is less recognised. This term captures those occasions when instances of 
boundary-making and the rules governing boundary-crossing become either a) related to 
specific policy areas, rather than part of a complete bundle or package of policies 
typically belonging to state sovereignty; b) non-uniform, applying to some states but not 
others; or c) flexible in response to events or demands, operating only when certain 
conditions hold. The creation of Native American reservations as semi-autonomous 
territories, exempt from numerous aspects of federal law, is a good example of boundary-
unbundling. These territories depart from the standard internal boundary-making process 
adopted for the fifty sub-federal states of the United States, and so are non-uniform and 
flexible, while only applying to a specific bundle of policies. Another example of such 
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unbundling is the asymmetric devolution of various self-governing powers to different 
authorities within a state, such as occurs in the UK where the regional legislatures of 
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and London possess different competences, though all 
are greater than those of other regions and municipalities within even more populous 
areas of England. A somewhat different example of boundary-unbundling is the 
establishment of special visa relations between countries or types of workers, in the 
former case giving expression to enduring relations of reciprocity and in the latter case 
attempting to respond to changeable domestic labour market demands.1  
 
Any serious attempt to understand the boundaries of a polity must be able to determine 
the nature of boundary-making, boundary-crossing and boundary-unbundling within that 
political community. All three boundary phenomena enumerated here take on an 
idiosyncratic form in the EU context . Concerning external boundary-making, the EU has 
constitutionalised both accession and secession clauses, suggesting that both the real and 
imagined European political community is unusually pliable. While states have 
occasionally changed their territorial composition over the centuries on a voluntary basis, 
it is rare that voluntary territorial accession or withdrawal has been codified by a polity. 
When it comes to internal boundary-making, the significant number of multi-national 
states (e.g. Belgium, Spain and the UK) within the EU render it uniquely susceptible to 
the creation of new sovereign states within its borders. In the national context, when one 
                                                 
1 Our typology is influenced by, but differs from, other boundary typologies found in the migration literature 
(e.g. Bauböck 1998; Zolberg and Woon 1999). These authors are primarily concerned with how internal 
boundaries of membership and identity change within a receiving society due to ‘patterns of negotiation 
between newcomers and hosts’ (Zolberg and Woon 1999: 9)  By contrast, our account does not privilege the 
perspective of boundary-crossing over other types of boundary, while our distinction between external and 
internal boundaries allows us to include boundary negotiation involving multiple states, rather than being 
simply limited to negotiations within a particular state.   
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jurisdiction within the state separates from another to create a different territorial body 
(such as the secession of Jura from the canton of Bern in 1979 to create its own cantonal 
authority within Switzerland), there is no question that the newly constituted political 
units will remain members of the national polity. In the EU context, however, the 
secession of e.g. Scotland from the UK is not a mere jurisdictional reordering but the 
creation of a new sovereign state that would change the membership structure of the EU. 
This raises unique normative questions concerning the right of a newly created state to 
automatic EU membership.     
 
The case of boundary-crossing in the EU is also relatively different from the national 
context. Although internal free movement may be just as accessible in principle within 
the EU as it is within the nation-state, the right of each EU member state to decide upon 
its official language(s) of administration produces high practical barriers to internal 
migration. It is true that many nation-states are themselves linguistically divided. 
However, the sheer extent of linguistic diversity within the EU ensures that an 
individual’s level of multi-linguistic competence will have a major impact in determining 
the extent to which she can access the goods provided by free movement (Lacey 2015). 
The rules governing external boundary-crossing take on an idiosyncratic form in the EU 
context because the competences for foreign and security policy or migration and refugee 
policy and administration primarily lie in the member states’ hands. This contrasts with 
the model of the nation-state, where such decisions are entrusted to the central 
government. Because of the need to secure high-levels of consensual intergovernmental 
cooperation, the EU has been peculiarly hampered in its capacity to coherently address 
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issues from within these policy domains as a unified actor (Guild, Costello, Garlick et al. 
2015).  
 
Boundary-unbundling in the EU comes about in numerous respects. The two main types 
are associated with multiple speeds and variable geometry. In the first case, despite the 
common acquis on joining the EU, not all member states are immediately involved in the 
same bundle of policies (Piris 2012). In the case of the euro and the Schengen Area, for 
example, not all states may meet the criteria to join with immediate effect. By contrast, 
variable geometry reflects the more permanent desire of certain member-states to opt-out 
of certain collective policies (Adler-Nissen 2009). As a result, the EU admits of some 
internal functional boundaries whereby some states work more closely than others in the 
production of certain goods and thereby subject themselves to absorbing the advantages 
and disadvantages of this deeper integration.  
 
Differentiated association is the primary way in which the rules governing boundary-
crossing are made more flexible in the EU. On the one hand, the EU has various classes 
of agreements with states beyond its borders, establishing particularly close relations with 
certain ‘association states’, like Norway and Switzerland, where a whole range of 
reciprocal rights are introduced (including free movement) (Eriksen and Fossum 2015). 
On the other hand, the global trend of increased cooperation and coordination between 
cities and regions has also affected the EU. Sub-national actors, like city mayors and 
NGOs, and non-state actors like financial institutions have become important players in 
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establishing  transnational networks and projects, leading to a highly flexible set of 
associations promoting regional trading and cultural links (Evgeniy 2016).  
 
The Normativity of Boundaries  
It would be wrong to suggest everything the EU does involves challenging existing 
boundaries. After all, the day-to-day operations of European institutions are primarily 
concerned with passing secondary law that must functionally assume a set of relatively 
fixed political boundaries. However, significant intermittent boundary changing events, 
like the Eastern Enlargement or the introduction of the euro, have encouraged scholars to 
regularly think about the nature of Europe’s unusually fluid boundaries. Such situations 
not only demand descriptive and explanatory research, but also raise more fundamental 
normative questions. The questions of where political boundaries should be drawn, the 
extent to which they ought to be fluid, and the appropriate rules for governing the 
management of these boundaries have become more open for the EU in recent years, 
intensifying the need for a more developed political theory of the EU (Bellamy and Lacey 
2017).  
 
Cosmopolitanism and statism, both of which have been understood according to different 
traditions, such as republicanism and liberalism, and methodologies, such as analytical 
and post modern, provide the two normative traditions standardly applied to the EU. 
Cosmopolitans seek to constrain the ways political institutions, however configured, 
operate so as to ensure they treat ‘every human being’ as having ‘global stature as an 
ultimate unit of moral concern’ (Pogge 1992). Therefore, cosmopolitans view boundaries 
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as leading to unjustifiable forms of discrimination by creating arbitrary distinctions 
between how individuals within and outside any given boundary are treated. Hence, they 
have argued variously for the re-making of borders in ever more inclusive ways through 
the creation of supra-national political communities and ultimately a world state (Cabrera 
2004); for the permissibility of boundary crossing and a generalised policy of open 
borders (Carens 2013); and for a general unbundling of all boundaries within a network 
of transnational political communities (Pogge 1992). 
 
Three broad possible views of the EU follow from the cosmopolitan perspective.  One 
version holds that the forces of globalisation have undermined the nation-state, but that a 
centralised federal Europe, that is itself not unlike a nation-state writ large, can fill the 
gap (Duff 2011). Another, more truly cosmopolitan, version is not so much supra-
national as post-national in orientation (Habermas 1999: 105-127), viewing moves 
towards federalism as an alternative to, rather than a new form of, the unitary sovereign 
state. Finally, a third holds that the EU can be restructured as a series of multiple 
transnational networks among civil society actors (Bohman 2004). 
 
Although not uncritical of the EU, cosmopolitans regard it as the closest real 
approximation of their ideal. The EU is thought particularly strong on at least four 
dimensions: codification of human rights and international citizenship; increasing 
interdependence; the strengthening of authoritative international institutions; and the rise 
of post-national identity and discourse. The explanatory theory of neo-functionalism and 
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the normative demands of cosmopolitanism make for natural bedfellows as the former 
hypothesises deeper European integration along these dimensions. 
 
Statists do not deny the global injustices that arise from disparities in wealth between rich 
and poor countries and that these should be diminished. However, they claim that law and 
democracy cannot boot-strap and provide the source of their own polity conditions. Such 
institutions imply a people who are entitled to make and enforce decisions within a given 
domain in a way that make sense to this people in accord with its public culture (Pettit 
2006). Accordingly, they contend that any attempt to right the world’s wrongs should be 
done through the coordination of nation-states rather than their replacement by 
international authorities of a regional or global nature (Miller 2007). Consequently, 
statists have tended to view national boundaries as legitimate and boundary unbundling 
within them a way of ensuring different social and political spheres get treated with equal 
concern and respect, so that boundary crossing becomes a transgressive threat to liberty 
and justice (Walzer 1983; 1984). 
 
Statists conceive the EU as a cooperative bloc with the goal and effect of preserving 
rather than diminishing state autonomy (Milward 1992). By extension, the EU emerges as 
a reaction against the negative externalities of globalisation, that serves to protect states 
and their citizens from an otherwise unregulated space of market forces and technological 
developments. Just as cosmopolitanism finds a natural partner in neo-functionalist theory, 
so statism welcomes an intergovernmental understanding of the EU, although to be fair 
not always of the ‘liberal’ kind (Moravcsik 1993). On this view, Europe’s integration 
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results from bargaining between national leaders, who are responsive to the demands of 
their national constituency and aware of the need to secure mutually credible 
commitments through the establishment of shared institutions. Although statists have 
concerns about the strengthening of supranational institutions and the continued ceding of 
national sovereignty in line with the Union’s goal of ‘ever closer Union’, they contend 
the EU is and should remain primarily intergovernmental. 
 
Recently, a demoicratic perspective has emerged, to which all three editors are aligned 
(Nicolaïdis 2013; Bellamy 2013; Lacey 2017), that situates itself as a third way 
transcending the dichotomous tendencies of the statist-cosmopolitan debate. It does so by 
recognising the importance of developed political cultures for the process of political 
justification and self-determination, while acknowledging the demands of citizens as 
independent actors who are not just members of a nation-state but also have transnational 
rights claims. As such, demoicracy identifies the EU as a union with two normative 
subjects: states and citizens. Pursuing the common good of Europe, therefore, means 
protecting and promoting the values and interests of both states as self-governing 
collectives and individuals as autonomous citizens.  
 
Two core values underpin this demoicratic argument: the republican value of non-
domination and the liberal value of mutual recognition. Accordingly, demoicrats insist 
that neither citizens nor states should be arbitrarily interfered with, either by 
supranational institutions or one another, but are required to act in systematically other-
regarding ways. While demoicrats differ over the precise institutional implications of 
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these values (Cheneval, Lavenex, Schimmelfennig 2015), they broadly agree that a 
demoicratically configured EU should uphold the principles of democratic integrity, non-
discrimination and equal legislative rights. Democratic integrity means that neither EU 
actions, nor those of member states, should undermine the ability of states to govern 
themselves or of citizens to be fully participating members of the EU polity. Non-
discrimination insists that all laws must be applied consistently to member states and 
citizens respectively. Finally, equal legislative rights require that both Union citizens and 
states must be equally represented in decision-making in the domain of secondary law.  
 
The EU falls short of demoicratic values in many respects. Nevertheless, demoicrats are 
in some ways less critical of the EU’s basic architecture than either cosmopolitans or 
statists. They view the EU Treaties and institutions as having given at least partial 
expression to a dual subjectivity of states and citizens. Consequently, the EU appears to 
neither approximate an intergovernmental organisation of states nor a proto-cosmopolitan 
community of citizens.  In some respects, a multi-level governance account best captures 
the demoicratic understanding of the EU. On this account, the making and unbundling of 
boundaries both at the state level and above, below or across it, protect the different 
demoi to which individuals belong, with the EU best seen as facilitating their joint and 
equal governing. 
 
A strong bias in favour of demoicracy runs through this special issue, with five papers 
developing a political theory of the EU along these lines. In particular, our own co-
authored papers attempt to tackle what are perhaps some of the most fundamental 
 18 
normative issues within each category of boundary-making (Lacey and Bauböck on 
territorial integrity), boundary-crossing (Nicolaïdis and Viehoff on external free 
movement) and boundary-unbundling (Bellamy and Kröger on differentiated integration). 
Brexit throws up unique challenges of boundary-making and boundary crossing for the 
EU that are analysed from a demoicratic perspective by Lord and Shaw respectively.  
 
The more empirically-minded contributions to this special issue have not explicitly taken 
up a general normative position, but there are clear senses in which they throw up 
important normative questions that any political theory of the EU must answer. Should 
the EU develop more robust redistributive programmes, especially if it may be necessary 
to sustain free movement (Maas)? To what extent should the more powerful states be 
constrained from dictating the EU’s integration trajectory (Zielonka)? Should the EU 
engage in a more concrete and rounded myth-building process to mitigate  its ontological 
insecurity (Della Sala)? What are the legitimate procedures for EU institutions in 
adopting emergency legislation to deal with imminent issues, like the threat of terrorism 
(Cross)? What does the EU owe to territories seceding from a member state (Closa)? 
 
 
 
 
European Boundaries in Question? 
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The very ideas of deepening and widening European integration imply the re-making, 
crossing and unbundling of boundaries below and beyond the nation-state. 
Unsurprisingly, the resulting processes of boundary-making and boundary-crossing have 
been both challenging and challenged throughout the EU’s history, often producing in 
their turn boundary-unbundling, as with differentiated integration for the euro. However, 
as we shall now explain with reference to the papers in this volume, the legitimacy and 
sustainability of the European boundary regime is currently being called into question 
like never before by an unusual confluence of internal and external pressures. While  we 
describe each paper under one category below, several papers inevitably touch on  some 
of others as well (see Table 1). 
 
<Table 1 about here > 
 
Boundary-making  
The making and remaking of Europe’s external boundaries is perhaps the most 
dramatically contested phenomenon today. For the first time, a member state has elected 
to leave the Union,  shrinking rather than expanding its external borders and turning 
internal into external boundaries. Although the EU was in principle based on the 
voluntary participation of its members, the permanence of membership has until now 
been taken for granted in practice.  By establishing a precedent for withdrawal from the 
Union, Brexit has put into question the stability of its existing membership, especially as 
the voices that called for secession from the EU in the UK have formidable counterparts 
in other European countries.  
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The volume opens with Chris Lord’s paper addressing the novel issues raised by Brexit. 
It explores not the rights or wrongs of leaving the EU, but rather the respective duties the 
EU and the seceding state have to each other in negotiating an exit.. Lord identifies 
member states as constituting a collective action group who have shaped laws together, 
limited one another’s range or choices and managed the externalities of international 
engagement. He concedes that in practice each member state will be the final judge of 
what it owes to any other, yet argues that all parties have a duty to ensure that withdrawal 
from the Union is governed by fair terms of cooperation.  
 
Meanwhile, the last decade has seen a new kind of “enlargement” enter the EU lexicon: 
namely, internal enlargement through secession from existing member states, with 
Scotland and Catalonia serving as the most pressing examples. With specific reference to 
these cases, Carlos Closa  asks whether or not territories that secede from existing 
member states to form new sovereign entities are entitled to automatic accession to the 
EU. On the one hand, there are instances where secession from a member state may be 
done by legal consent or else unilaterally. On the other hand, it is possible that 
prospective secession may be in part motivated by the desire of the seceding territory to 
remain in the EU as the existing member state withdraws from the Union. Closa argues 
that any new EU member state must undergo a process of negotiation given that 
increasing the number of member states will have an impact on the composition of 
European institutions. Although he  insists that  member states should retain  a right to 
veto internal enlargement, he maintains that there are circumstances  in which the EU has 
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special duties to provide an easy route to accession, or at least some form of remedial 
arrangement for the citizens of the seceding territory.  
 
The UK’s withdrawal and the prospect of a Scottish secession from the UK have in turn 
provided challenges to the external enlargement agenda of the EU.. The accession of 
Eastern European countries was not uncontroversial and helped to motivate the British 
case for leaving. There is now little appetite to conclude existing accession negotiations 
with Serbia or Montenegro, or to commence them with those, Albanian and Macedonia, 
preparing for such negotiations. In the future, it is likely that the EU will rely more 
heavily on associated agreements and other bilateral treaties in lieu of granting states 
membership or accession status.  
 
Joseph Lacy and Rainer Bauböck ask three normative questions pertaining to the process 
of enlargement and the development of bilateral relations, two substantive and one 
procedural. The first substantive question concerns boundary-making and the legitimate 
limits of the EU’s borders (i.e. its final frontier). The second substantive question 
addresses boundary-unbundling and the nature of legitimate relations between the EU and 
non-member states. Contrary to the Treaties, the authors find that there are no 
normatively valid grounds for restricting EU membership to “European states”, although 
there are good reasons why the EU should not seek to approximate anything like a world 
state. Meanwhile, they argue that three established normative principles of inclusion 
(stakeholder, subject to coercion and affected interests) must guide the EU’s relations 
with non-member states in the creation of flexible bilateral agreements. The procedural 
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question concerns the appropriate decision-making rules for enlarging the Union and 
creating agreements between the EU and non-member states. Here, the authors endorse 
current EU practices of requiring unanimity for external enlargement and supermajorities 
for certain kind of international agreements.  
 
Vincent Della Sala explores the consequences of the EU’s pliable borders for the 
imaginary dimension of external boundary-making. According to Della Sala, the EU has 
attempted to formulate a territorial myth that draws on the kind of resources typically 
associated with nation-states. He contends that such myth-making forges a collective 
memory that legitimates the historical links between members of the polity and projects a 
sense of future purpose for the community. Ontological security is the feeling of being-at-
home in one’s political community and requires above all else the relative stability of 
borders and the capacity to control them. Therefore, myth-making is best placed to 
contribute to ontological security in a context of fixed territorial borders. However, 
precisely because of the EU’s uncertainty with regard to its final composition, given the 
possibility of enlargement and withdrawal, it’s territorial myth cannot be completed. The 
ontological security of Europeans is thereby undermined in important respects and 
influences in turn how citizens and their representatives react to the EU’s boundary-
making and boundary-crossing regime.  
 
 
Boundary-crossing 
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Directly related to the British challenge to Europe’s external boundaries is the 
questioning of internal boundary crossing through unrestricted free movement and EU 
citizenship rights. Before voting on EU membership, the British government had 
negotiated certain qualifications to the rights of European citizens when moving to the 
UK (including limited access to social and health services in their first years). 
Simultaneously, the Swiss vote to cap migration from the EU in violation of bilateral 
Treaties has indicated further popular dissatisfaction with unrestricted free movement 
across the EU and certain associated countries. The indirect concessions on free 
movement (through rights of access to benefits provision) that were granted to the UK in 
its pre-referendum deal with the EU is a sign that unrestricted free movement within the 
EU can no longer be considered non-negotiable. This point is underscored by recent 
judicial developments, with the European Court leaning towards allowing greater leeway 
to member states in determining access by non-citizens to their welfare systems.2 
 
Jo Shaw compares the UK and the EU as multilevel polities, focusing on the rules 
governing the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and the 2016 Brexit referendum. 
On her view, referendum design is a key to the conception of citizenship and political 
community advanced by the polity in question. While the Scottish referendum extended 
the franchise to EU nationals resident in Scotland, it excluded all other British citizens 
and made a simple majority the required threshold to determine the result. The Brexit 
referendum was more problematic in a) failing to enfranchise those border-crossers who 
                                                 
2 The latest in a series of CJEU judgments on this issue rules that member states may exclude Union 
citizens who go to that state to find work from certain non-contributory social security benefits. Judgment 
in Case C-67/14 Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa, Sonita, Valentina and Valentino Alimanovic, 15 
September s 
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would be keenly affected by the referendum result (i.e. EU nationals resident in the UK) 
and b) allowing for a simple polity-wide majority, thereby failing to take into account the 
distinctive preferences of the different national demoi of England, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales when setting the decision-making threshold. Shaw claims these 
choices in the referendum design imply an exclusive and overly homogenous 
understanding of citizenship and political community that are now having a large impact, 
with uncertainty hanging over the future of both EU nationals resident in the UK and the 
territories of Northern Ireland and Scotland.   
 
By contrast, Willem Maas explores the nature and challenges of   border crossing in the 
EU by comparison with federal states such as the United States and Canada.  Taking the 
case studies of students and workers, and how they operate within the free movement 
regimes of Canada, the EU and the US, Maas shows that all multilevel political 
communities must balance the desire for equal citizenship with local demands for 
diversity. He demonstrates that migration between US states or Canadian provinces raise 
worries about social dumping that are analogous to those emphasised by Eurosceptics 
opposed to EU free movement. Yet, despite significant internal variation in the US and 
Canada, common welfare programmes assuage these worries about the ability of 
governments to control the boundaries of political community. He advises similar 
remedial welfare measures should be considered in the EU to ensure the sustainability of 
its free movement regime. 
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External boundary-crossing in the EU is being challenged by two major developments, 
the recent surge in migrants claiming refugees status, most notably from Syria, and the 
increase in successful terrorist attacks (cf. Léonard and Kaunert 2016). The first 
development has made manifest the inadequacy of Europe’s rules and institutions for 
managing external border-crossing. Failure to equitably share the burden of 
accommodating refugees across Europe or adequately to assist states at the EU’s 
Southern border in processing incoming refugees, has led to unilateral action. Most 
significant was Germany’s decision to absorb a large share of the migrants. The concern 
that some refugees may themselves pose terror threats, or otherwise present a challenge 
to law and order, has further intensified the demand for a more secure external border. 
This concern has added to the pressure on internal free movement, as some do not want 
their states to become destinations for ‘potentially dangerous’ foreigners admitted by 
other states.  
 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Juri Viehoff regard the current refugee regime in Europe as 
deficient and attempt to determine the normative principles underlying a more acceptable 
arrangement. They explore the normative status of internal free movement within the EU 
against the benchmark of what they refer to as the demoicratic deal: the preservation of 
national or group autonomy predicated on a commitment to others outside that circle of 
autonomy. They adopt the point of view of a particular type of, admittedly idealized, 
citizen to think about political borders and their consequences in Europe referred to as the 
“virtuous demoicrat”. This virtuous demoicrat considers the issue of border crossing in 
turn from ideal theory and non-ideal theory, considering issues of procedures and 
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substance. A virtuous demoicrat must sustain the consistency between internal and 
external commitments to mutual recognition to the greatest extent possible. They argue 
that  a refugee regime must evolve in Europe to better balance member states’ shared 
commitment to free border crossing with the unequal distribution of integration spare-
capacity within each of them.  
 
The second development challenging the nature of Europe’s external border crossing is 
the growing threat of terrorism, made manifest by the effectiveness of suicide attackers . 
Recent attacks in Paris, Brussels and elsewhere have led to redoubled calls among some 
actors for a hardening of Europe’s external borders through greater security cooperation 
between member states. This trend lies in stark contrast to the more vocal calls over the 
last several years for the reassertion of political boundaries at the national level. Indeed, 
despite starting the process of exiting from the EU so that the UK may do more on its 
own, the desirability of strong and potentially deeper cooperation in security matters is 
hardly questioned.  
 
In her paper, Maia Cross shows how European political boundaries vis-à-vis the outside 
world are becoming stronger in important respects, and that the area of security 
cooperation offers an example of this trend.  She explains how counter-terrorism efforts 
have led to extensive forms of boundary-unbundling in the establishment of differentiated 
forms of association with third countries. She breaks down her analysis into three 
categories of further cooperation – intelligence sharing, formal and informal diplomacy, 
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and the internal-external nexus of security. Although she admits many of these measures 
have been taken in emergency conditions, she defends their legitimacy.    
 
Boundary-unbundling 
Although there is already a degree of differentiated integration in the EU, the standard 
approach to deeper integration has been to strive for uniform participation. Yet, as the EU 
becomes more socioeconomically diverse because of enlargement, while simultaneously 
integrating on a greater number of policy issues, a “one size fits all” approach appears 
increasingly inappropriate. The euro-crisis has indicated particularly forcefully the 
difficulties of deeper integration among EU states with a broad level of socioeconomic 
disparity. New models of differentiated integration are therefore gaining currency in the 
EU, challenging the existing presumption towards uniform integration and suggesting 
that internal functional boundaries may proliferate in the future. Not only is this evident 
in the five scenarios for the future of Europe presented by the European Commission 
(2017), an openness to more flexible boundaries has been telegraphed by the leaders of 
the Eurozone’s four biggest economies (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) in the wake of 
the EU’s 60th anniversary. 
 
Richard Bellamy and Sandra Kröger explore differentiated integration as a way in which 
certain aspects of the acquis have been unbundled to allow not only a multi-speed EU, 
but also a degree of variable geometry. Such measures have generally been regarded as 
regrettable if necessary pragmatic concessions. By contrast, the authors contend that 
many instances of differentiated integration can be normatively justified on democratic 
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grounds as suitable ways to accommodate economic, social and cultural heterogeneity. 
They distinguish instrumental, constitutional and legislative differentiation and relate 
them respectively to problems of proportionality, partiality and difference. In areas where 
economic and social heterogeneity means member states lack an equal stake in a 
collective measure, thereby risking free-riding or its underfunding, then overcoming the 
proportionality problem may suggest the relevant club should be smaller than the entire 
membership of the EU – at least temporarily. Likewise, where cultural heterogeneity 
generates differences in constitutional values, collective agreements on the basis of 
majority rule may fail to treat all impartially, so that some opt outs may be justified. 
Finally, even when there are collective agreements, legislation may need to be 
differentiated rather than uniform to allow for relevant differences.  
 
Just when differentiated integration is becoming a more respectable position in 
mainstream political discourse, the policy of pursuing differentiated association is being 
challenged as popular resistance to trade deals (like the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership) and association agreements (as with Ukraine) has called into 
question the flexibility of external boundary-crossing in the EU. Despite this backlash 
against globalisation, however, functional pressures continue to push the EU in the 
opposite direction. To the extent that global trade and communication technologies are 
forging stronger relationships between sub-state actors (such as city mayors) and non-
state actors (such as large enterprises and civil society organisations) and individuals, the 
EU is faced with incentives to soften its boundary-crossing regime and expand on its 
forms of differentiated association that are increasingly difficult to ignore.  
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In the final paper, Jan Zielonka recognises variable geometry as the form of unbundling 
most consistent with the EU’s current architecture. Yet he believes that three radical 
alternatives for the future of European integration should be further investigated – models 
that differ markedly from those envisaged by the Commission (2017). These models are  
an ordo-liberal Empire dominated by Germany as the EU hegemon, functional networks, 
and cascading pluralism. These latter two models represent a radical and cross-cutting 
unbundling of national borders in a transnational rather than a supranational direction, 
that offers a return to what some have seen as a pre-Westphalian pre-sovereign political 
order, and a model of the EU akin to the Hanseatic league. Utilising recent studies in the 
field of geography, economics, and communication, Zielonka argues that functional 
pressures to unbound traditional forms of boundary-making and boundary-crossing are 
increasingly reconfiguring the relationship between territory, authority, and rights in 
Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
This special issue aims to open up a research agenda about the ways changes in the 
making, crossing and unbundling of boundaries relate to one another, and how these 
dynamics have been affected by the dramatic endogenous and exogenous pressures 
besetting the EU as it passes its 60th anniversary. In particular, we hope to illustrate the 
broader relevance of the questions arising from Brexit, the migration crisis and the 
management of the euro. What happens if secession from an existing member state arises 
at the same time as secession of a member state? Should internal enlargement be 
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considered similar to external enlargement, given the special circumstances of a state 
acceding from within? Must the easing of internal border crossing necessarily be 
balanced by the hardening of external EU borders (and vice versa)? How can 
differentiation be approached consistently internally and externally? Can clever 
unbundling render integration more effective and equitable and circumvent calls for EU 
exits? These are questions Europeans will be living with for years to come. 
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